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Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania: Recommendation
for an Independent Central Office
Jeffrey G. Cokin*
Jonathan Mallamud**
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidentiary hearings play a central role in the administrative
process.' To determine how the agencies of the Commonwealth fur-
nish officers to preside at adjudicatory hearings, the Pennsylvania
Department of Justice asked the American Bar Association's Center
for Administrative Justice to undertake a study of the hearings
conducted by state agencies.2 In the final report that followed the
study,3 it was recommended that the state establish a central office
* General Counsel, Union Chelsea National Bank, New York, New York. Formerly,
Deputy Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. B.S., 1970, University of Rhode
Island; J.D., 1973, Temple University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. A.B., 1958, Oberlin
College; J.D., 1961, Harvard University Law School.
This article develops from participation in a study of the hearing officer procedures in
Pennsylvania conducted by the Center for Administrative Justice for the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Justice. See notes 2 & 3 infra.
1. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson, 442 Pa. 289, 275 A.2d 6 (1971); Begis v. Industrial Bd., 9
Pa. Commw. Ct. 558, 308 A.2d 643 (1973); Administrative Procedure Act, § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554
(1970); PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.31 (Purdon 1962).
2. The study was financed, in part, by a federal grant under the Intergovernmental Per-
sonnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-648, 84 Stat. 1909 (1971) (codified in scattered sections of
5, 42 U.S.C.). One of the authors of this article, Jeffrey G. Cokin, was in charge of the project
for the Department. The other author, Professor Jonathan Mallamud, served as project
director. Milton M. Carrow, Esq., Director of the ABA's Center for Administrative Justice,
supervised the project, which was done pursuant to an agreement between the Center and
the Pennsylvania Department of Justice. The authors wish to express their thanks to Mr.
Carrow, who organized the project, provided a great deal of support, and offered many
substantive suggestions. Mr. Carrow convened an advisory committee for the project, and the
authors wish to thank the members of that committee for their many useful comments and
suggestions as well as members of the legal staff of the Pennsylvania Department of Justice
who assisted in the project. The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the
authors.
The Center for Administrative Justice has recently become the National Center for Admin-
istrative Justice and is now affiliated with the Consortium of Universities of the Washington
Metropolitan Area.
3. The final report, "A System of Providing Hearing Officers for Adjudicatory Hearings,"
was written by Jonathan Mallamud and submitted under his name and Milton M. Carrow,
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to provide hearing officers for those agencies that conduct hearings.
If such a proposal were adopted, adjudicatory hearings held by state
agencies, unless presided over by the head of the agency, would be
conducted by a hearing officer who would be provided by, and ac-
countable to, the central office rather than to the administrative
agency responsible for the final determination of the dispute be-
tween it and the private party involved. Legislation to establish
such a central office has been prepared by the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Justice.4 In this article, we will present the factors that led
to the proposal and discuss our view of the merits of a system of
providing independent hearing officers through a central office.
A. Purpose of Hearings
Administrative hearings protect those affected by government
action from being subjected to arbitrary or mistaken decision-
making. In declaring what fundamental hearing elements state
agencies must afford welfare recipients before terminating their
benefits, the Supreme Court of the United States held that states
must provide an effective opportunity to defend, including confron-
tation of adverse witnesses, presentation of evidence, and oral argu-
ments.' It is well-settled that a hearing that does not offer a party
an opportunity to know and confront the adverse evidence on which
the government will rely "is not the fair hearing essential to due
process."' And the protection against erroneous action that an evi-
dentiary hearing makes possible serves the interests of the state as
well as those of the parties.7 The special concern for the process by
which administrative agencies develop the factual basis for their
on behalf of the American Bar Association's Center for Administrative Justice, to the Penn-
sylvania Department of Justice in May, 1975. The report will hereinafter be referred to as
Final Report. The views in the report represent individual views and are not the result of any
action taken or consideration given by the American Bar Association.
4. See ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER ACT (Blue Draft), prepared by the Pennsylvania
Department of Justice, February 1, 1977.
5. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970). In Pennsylvania, the Administrative
Rules of Practice and Procedure give parties the "right of presentation of evidence, cross-
examination, objection motion and argument." 1 Pa. Code § 36.126. The basic right to notice
and hearing is provided in the Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.31
(Purdon 1962).
6. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
7. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (the state as well as a student has an
interest in unwarranted suspensions from school); Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 524, 105
A.2d 545, 560 (1954).
Vol. 15: 605
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decisions was recently expressed by the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court in the following terms:
We also recognize that the most critical function in the prose-
cution and adjudication of administrative cases is the resolu-
tion of disputed facts because the findings of fact which result
from administrative proceedings are subject to only limited
appellate review. The fact finding process, therefore, must be
afforded the broadest dimensions of constitutional protection.'
In addition, a proper evidentiary record must be developed in order
to permit a court to exercise its limited power to review the factual
basisfor an administrative decision.'
Administrative adjudications also involve the application of pol-
icy stated in statutes or administrative regulations, found in prior
cases or created by an administrative agency in the course of an
adjudication.'" The decision of cases not clearly covered by prior
determinations may call for arguments based on policy grounds and
any attempt to draw a sharp distinction between factual issues and
policy issues for the purposes of limiting administrative hearings to
questions of fact would probably prove too difficult." Consequently,
adjudicatory hearings before administrative agencies should be
viewed as opportunities for the parties to make whatever policy
arguments are not foreclosed by statute or administrative ruling or
regulation."1
8. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 295, 302, 361 A.2d 497, 501 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 303 (1937).
10. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947).
11. See Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem., 412 U.S. 924
(1973).
12. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1977-1978) for the text
of Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law, which includes provisions for notice and an
opportunity to be heard and establishes procedures to govern administrative tribunals once
a hearing has begun. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.51 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978) enumerates
the agencies to which the Administrative Agency Law applies. It states:
(a) ...this act shall apply to the following agencies: (1) Department of Agriculture;
(2) Department of State (except election cases and except proceedings involving the
original settlement, resettlement, review of refund of bonus, interests or payments
made into the State Treasury); (3) Insurance Department; (4) Department of Public
Instruction, in so far as relates to its powers and duties in the issuance of licenses to
barbers, and in so far as relates to the powers and duties of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction under the "Pennsylvania Loyalty Act"; (5) Board of Property; (6)
1977
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B. Parties Entitled to Hearings
In Pennsylvania, under the Administrative Agency Law," all par-
ties to adjudicatory proceedings have a right to a hearing."
"Adjudicatory proceedings" in this context refers to agency orders
or decisions "affecting personal or property rights, privileges, im-
munities or obligations" of a party. 5 In addition to the rights con-
ferred by statute, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that
hearings are required "where the administrative action is adjudica-
tory in nature and involves substantial property rights."'" Beyond
state law, the United States Supreme Court has required that states
afford administrative hearings to persons in a variety of situations. 7
State Board of Education; (7) State Board of Censors; (8) State Board of Medical
Education and Licensure; (9) State Board of Pharmacy; (10) State Dental Council and
Examining Board; (11) State Board of Optometrical Examiners; (12) State Board of
Osteopathic Examiners; (13) Osteopathic Surgeons' Examining Board; (14) State
Board of Nurse Examiners; (15) State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners; (16)
State Board of Examiners of Architects; (17) State Registration Board of Professional
Engineers; (18) State Real Estate Commission; (19) State Board of Examiners of
Public Accountants; (20) State Board of Private Business Schools; (21) State Board
of Private Academic Schools; (22) State Board of Private Correpondence Schools; (23)
State Board of Private Trade Schools; (24) State Board of Cosmetology; (25) State
Board of Chiropractic Examiners; (26) Pennsylvania Securities Commission; (27)
State Soil Conservation Commission; (28) Water and Power Resources Board; (29)
Flood Control Commission; (30) Anthracite Mine Inspectors' Examining Board; (31)
Mine Inspectors' Examining Board for the Bituminous Coal Mines; (32) Pennsylvania
Parkway Commission; (33) Sanitary Water Board; (34) State Board of Undertakers;
(35) State Workmen's Insurance Board; (36) Industrial Board; (37) State Board of
Vocational Rehabilitation; (39) State Athletic Commission; (41) Pennsylvania Aero-
nautics Commission; (42) State Planning Board; (43) State Civil Service Commission;
(44) State Tax Equalization Board; (45) Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view; (46) State Employees' Retirement Board; (47) Public School Employees Retire-
ment Board; (48) Department of Public Welfare; and to any other agency which has
been made subject to the provisions of this act by any other act of Assembly.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1977-1978).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.31 (Purdon 1962).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.2(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). The full definition
reads as follows:
"Adjudication" means any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an
agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities or obligations of
any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudication is made, but shall
not mean any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling based upon a
proceeding before a court, or which involves the seizure or forfeiture of property, or
which involves paroles pardons or releases from mental institutions.
16. Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson, 442 Pa. 289, 296, 275 A.2d 6, 9 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ten day suspension of a student); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of a driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
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Although Goldberg v. Kelly 8 and the cases following it"s rested on
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,21 in California
Department of Human Resources v. Java,' where the Supreme
Court imposed a requirement that states conduct hearings in cer-
tain unemployment compensation cases, the court did not reach the
constitutional issue but decided the case based on its interpretation
of the applicable statute.
There are signs that the United States Supreme Court may not
continue to expand the obligation of states to conduct administra-
tive hearings. In cases involving the denial of continued employ-
ment, the Supreme Court had held that one would be entitled to a
hearing where there was a "liberty" or "property" interest in-
volved.22 In Bishop v. Wood, 23 however, the Court held that a police-
man who had been permanently employed by a city government did
not have a sufficient property interest in his job to entitle him to a
hearing. In Board of Regents v. Roth,2' the Court had held that
property interests were created by state law. The Court in Bishop
apparently concluded that property rights created by state statute
could be limited if procedural protection was not included in the
statute. As Justice White stated in his dissenting opinion, "[iun the
concluding paragraph of its discussion of petitioner's property inter-
est, the majority holds that since neither the ordinance nor state law
provides for a hearing, or any kind of review of the City Manager's
dismissal decision, petitioner had no enforceable property interest
254 (1970). It should be noted that in Goss, the Supreme Court seemed to be saying that only
a very informal hearing need be held in most cases of short suspensions of students. The Court
said:
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and the time of the
hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that,
in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the
student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation
is.
419 U.S. at 582.
18. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
19. E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
20. See id. at 543; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970).
21. 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
22. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
23. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). The Court also held that the petitioner was not deprived of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest so as to entitle him to a hearing.
24. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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in his job." 5 If Bishop represents the attitude of the present Su-
preme Court towards requiring agency hearings generally, then it is
not likely that the Court will broaden the category of parties who
are entitled to state administrative hearings. Nevertheless, as has
been pointed out in this section, in addition to the already settled
federal requirements, Pennsylvania state law also imposes a re-
quirement of administrative hearings in a wide range of cases.
C. Fairness in Hearings
Where a potential adjudicator has already reached a conclusion
about the proper outcome of a particular case before the hearing,
that person should not participate in deciding the case. 6 Such a
proposition seems fundamental. Where an agency has already taken
a position on a policy question involved in an adjudication, however,
there is no bar to the agency deciding the case." When one focuses
on the rule-making powers of administrative agencies and the tend-
ency of courts and agencies to follow past decisions in which policy
questions have been resolved, this second proposition also seems
fundamental. The real problem in deciding the extent to which a
decision-maker must be free from involvement arises in cases where
the decision-maker has or seems to have an interest in the outcome.
25. 426 U.S. at 357. While Bishop certainly suggests reluctance on the part of the Supreme
Court to extend the category of cases in which states must afford hearings under the four-
teenth amendment, it is possible to read the case as resting on the ground that state law made
the petitioner's job terminable at will. Moreover, one must keep in mind that Bishop was a
5-4 decision. Justice Stevens recently distinguished Bishop in Codd v. Velger, 97 S. Ct. 882,
890 (1977) (dissenting opinion). In suggesting that a hearing should have been afforded
because a discharged state employee might have had a property interest in his job, Justice
Stevens said:
According to the state case cited by Judge Gurfein. . . the police commissioner may
terminate only "unsatisfactory employees," and his determination is reviewable in the
state courts on an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. . . . Unlike Bishop, in which
a hearing would have been pointless because nothing plaintiff could prove would enti-
tle him to keep his job, in this case the plaintiff may have had a right to continued
employment if he could rebut the charges against him.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
Codd does not represent any disposition on the part of the Court to expand the category of
cases in which hearings are required. There, in an unsigned opinion, the Court held that even
if the discharged employee might have a right to a hearing because the stigmatization in-
volved in the discharge impaired a protected liberty interest, the claim to a hearing had to
fail because there was no allegation that the allegedly stigmatizing report was false.
26. Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds,
381 U.S. 739 (1965).
27. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948).
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While, clearly, a decision-maker with a pecuniary interest in the
outcome of a case must be disqualified on due process grounds, 8
interests arising from one's official position in the governmental
structure may also require disqualification." Thus, it is not consis-
tent with due process for a mayor of a village to act as judge in cases
in which the fines imposed in those cases formed a substantial part
of the village revenues.3" Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has ruled that even though one may be acting in an official
capacity, one cannot be a member of the agency bringing a com-
plaint against a person and also sit as a member of the agency
deciding the case.3'
Other problems arise from administrative agencies' combination
of investigatory, prosecutorial, and judicial functions. Although
such a combination of functions does not inherently violate due
process, 32 care must be taken that the prosecutorial and judicial
functions are kept sufficiently separate to ensure that hearings re-
main impartial and fair. Thus, the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act33 provides that hearing officers presiding at adjudicatory
hearings may not be subject to the supervision of anyone engaged
in investigative or prosecutorial functions and that those who par-
ticipated in the investigatory or prosecutorial aspects of a case may
not participate or render advice in the decision of that case. In
Pennsylvania, a series of decisions has held that the person who
presents the case for the state, or who is involved in the prosecution,
may not advise or assist in the decision of the case. 3 But where the
functions are kept separate-even though both the prosecutor and
the person who advises the decision-maker work for the same
28. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
29. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
30. Id.
31. See Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969) (alternative holding).
32. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302
(1955); State Dental Council and Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 271, 318 A.2d 910,
914-15, (1974) (dictum); Wasniewski v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 166, 299 A.2d
676 (1973).
33. Administrative Procedure Act, § 5(c), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970).
34. Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975); Commonwealth Dept.
of Educ. v. Oxford Area School Dist., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 421, 356 A.2d 857 (1976); English
v. North East Bd. of Educ., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 348 A.2d 494 (1975); In re Feldman,
21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 451, 346 A.2d 895 (1975) (appeal pending before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court); Donnon v. Downington Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283
A.2d 92 (1971).
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agency-the hearings will probably not be considered to lack funda-
mental fairness merely because of the common employer.35 In keep-
ing with the idea that the common employer does not necessarily
give rise to a sufficient appearance of unfairness to vitiate due pro-
cess, the commonwealth court in City of Philadelphia v. Hays36
upheld the denial of disability benefits to a former city employee
even though the city solicitor appointed both the attorney for the
city and the attorney for the civil service commission that heard the
case.
Despite Hays, Pennsylvania may be moving toward a stricter rule
with regard to what constitutes insufficient separation of functions.
In Commonwealth Department of Insurance v. American Bankers
Insurance Co., 37 the commonwealth court reversed a determination
of the Insurance Commissioner because the hearing officer who
heard the case for the Commissioner was the direct supervisor of the
associate general counsel who presented the Department's case.,
Shortly before the decision in American Bankers, the common-
wealth court, in Commonwealth Human Relations Commission v.
Thorp, Reed & Armstrong" had upheld a decision in which the
general counsel to the Human Relations Commission sat as adviser
35. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976). In Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v.
Feeser, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 406, 341 A.2d 584 (1975), the commonwealth court set aside a
decision of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission on the grounds that the Commis-
sion's general counsel, who presented the case on behalf of the Commission before it, had
given legal advice to the Commission during the hearing. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed, 364 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1976), on the grounds that the Commission's counsel had merely
made adversary arguments on the record before the Commission. The supreme court stated:
"We find no evidence in the record to support the contention that PHRC's general counsel
advised the hearing panel at the hearing or in the decisional process." Id. at 1327.
36. 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 621, 320 A.2d 406 (1974).
37. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976) (petition for allowance of appeal to
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted January 31, 1977).
38. In remanding for a hearing "in which the separation of prosecutorial and judicial
functions will be strictly observed," the court described the objectionable procedure as
follows:
American's objection is based on the fact that the Associate Chief Counsel of the
Department was appointed a Deputy Insurance Commissioner for the purpose of acting
as the hearing examiner at American's hearing before the Department. As a result of
this appointment, the associate counsel who prosecuted the Department's case was the
direct subordinate of the hearing examiner who must act in an impartial judicial
capacity.
Id. at 190-91, 363 A.2d at 876.
39. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976).
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to the Commission at a hearing while an assistant attorney general
attached to the legal branch of the Commission presented the
charges.40 A possible distinction was that in this case the general
counsel had acted as adviser, not as a superior who sat as the hear-
ing officer for the Commissioner." Together, the cases demonstrate
that the commonwealth court will closely scrutinize the relation-
ship of the hearing examiner and those presenting an agency's
case.
Another area in which the commingling of functions must be
examined is where an agency first investigates and decides whether
to prosecute and then, after prosecution, makes the final determina-
tion of whether the charges have been proved. The general rule has
been that due process is not violated in such circumstances.' In
Dussia v. Barger," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced
with determining the constitutionality of the commingling in one
person of the power to decide whether charges should be brought in
the first place and the authority to make the ultimate determination
in the case. The United States Supreme Court in Withrow v.
Larkin" had specifically upheld such a commingling of functions in
a collegial body.45 Withrow, of course, does not foreclose a finding
that the commingling of preliminary prosecutorial functions with
40. Id.
41. In Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, the court stated:
[W]e have two individuals who are both within the same branch of an administrative
entity, one handling a prosecutorial function and the other separately handling an
adjudicatory function. These circumstances place us at the interface between a consti-
tutionally permissible and a constitutionally impermissible commingling of prosecu-
torial and adjudicatory functions.
Id. at 302, 361 A.2d at 501.
42. E.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing
Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Contra, Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d
667 (1975).
43. 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975).
44. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
45. The Supreme Court concluded:
No specific foundation has been presented for suspecting that the Board had been
prejudiced by its investigation or would be disabled from hearing and deciding on the
basis of the evidence to be presented at the contested hearing. The mere exposure to
evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to
impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing. Without a
showing to the contrary, state administrators "are assumed to be men of conscience
and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the
basis of its own circumstances."
Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
1977
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the making of a final decision does not provide due process." Ac-
cordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared to take a very
different view than that taken by the United States Supreme Court.
In Dussia, the court announced:
The decision to institute a prosecution is such a fundamental
prosecutorial function that it alone justifies concluding a dual
capacity where the individual also is charged with the responsi-
bility of making the ultimate determination of guilt or inno-
cence. Moreover, it is a decision which requires a judgment as
to the weight of the evidence against the accused, a judgment
which is incompatible with the judicial function of providing
an impartial forum for resolution of the issues presented.47
It would appear that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "is
applying a more stringent standard to prevent a commingling of the
judicial and the prosecutorial functions" than the "United States
Supreme Court is presently applying."" Therefore, one must ques-
tion whether, as a matter of state law, the combination of the func-
tion to make a preliminary determination with the function of
reaching a final decision after an adversary hearing is still permissi-
ble in Pennsylvania.49
It should be emphasized that the requirement of fairness in hear-
ings goes beyond simply requiring that there be no actual prejudice.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court tends to talk in terms of avoid-
ance of "the appearance of possible prejudice" and the prohibition
of procedures that are "susceptible to prejudice."50 Although an
essential function of evidentiary hearings is to ensure a high degree
of accuracy in decision-making, the appearance of fairness also
serves an important governmental function. Since law enforcement
ultimately depends on the people's acceptance of the law, it is im-
portant that those affected by agency action feel that the agency
acted fairly. Thus, apart from any legal requirements, fair adjudi-
catory procedures should be a goal of sound policy.
46. See National Rifle Ass'n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 407 F. Supp. 88
(D.D.C. 1976).
47. 466 Pa. 152, 165, 351 A.2d 667, 674 (1975) (footnote omitted).
48. English v. North East Bd. of Educ., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 244, 348 A.2d 494, 496
(1975).
49. See State Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Grumbles, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 74, 79,
347 A.2d 782, 785 (1975) (dictum).
50. See, e.g., Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 748, 337 A.2d 858, 860 (1975).
Vol. 15: 605
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II. PRESENT PRACTICE
At present, Pennsylvania does not have a uniform system for
making examiners available. Agency provisions for such decision-
makers range from situations where the administrative head con-
ducts the hearing and renders a decision, to the use of part-time
hearing officers either hired from outside the government on a con-
tract basis or drawn from the existing legal staff of the agency.
Moreover, great variations exist in the qualifications of the officers.
Both the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act' and the Pennsyl-
vania Securities Act of 19722 forbid the delegation of the hearing
function; hearings in those agencies are conducted by the agency
head or panels of members of the agency. Similarly, hearings con-
cerning the fixing of milk prices must be heard before one or more
members of the Milk Marketing Board. 3 Initial hearings are also
held before members of such boards and commissions as the Com-
mission on Charitable Organizations,54 the Industrial Board,5 and
several of the licensing boards within the Bureau of Professional and
Occupational Affairs." Several of the professional and occupational
licensing boards, however, now utilize hearing officers.57
Since parties in administrative adjudications are entitled to re-
ceive a hearing before an impartial tribunal,' it is important to
ensure that hearing officers are in a position to provide such a hear-
ing. Presently, where agency heads delegate the hearing function,
hearings are conducted by full or part-time hearing officers hired
pursuant to service purchase contracts, by full-time agency employ-
ees whose sole function is to hear cases, by full-time employees who
conduct hearings as only one of their duties, or by an agency lawyer
who conducts hearings as part of his agency duties. For example, in
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-606(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-304 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-1 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978); Final Report, supra note 3,
at 72.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1444 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
56. The State Dental Council Examining Board, for example, must sit either en banc or
in a panel whenever a hearing is conducted. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 122(h) (Purdon 1968).
See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1977-1978).
57. Even though the State Real Estate Commission remains the decision-maker, it may
delegate the hearing function to a hearing officer. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 440(b) (Purdon
1968). For other examples of licensing boards that may delegate the hearing function, see
generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1977-1978).
58. See text accompanying notes 26-50 supra.
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workmen's compensation59 and unemployment compensation
cases, 0 hearings are conducted by full-time employees who are sub-
ject to the state's civil service law. The Liquor Control Board em-
ploys, on an annual salary basis, part-time hearing officers who are
permitted to maintain their own law practices."' In the Department
of Agriculture, hearing officers are hired pursuant to a service con-
tract and are paid on a per diem basis. 2 Many other agencies, in-
cluding the Department of Education63 and the Department of
Labor and Industry 4 use an assistant attorney general or the
agency's chief counsel to conduct hearings. Usually, the hearing
function is only one of a wide variety of duties these individuals
perform. 5 In the Department of Health, hearing officers are hired
on an ad hoc basis in cases regarding new health care facilities.6
The hearing officer arrangement has recently been changed in at
least two agencies. In the Department of Public Welfare, a new
"Hearing and Appeals Unit" was created in response to a consent
decree issued by a federal district court.67 And, since many aspects
59. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 152 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
60. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 763(e) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
61. As a general rule, each of the Liquor Control Board's eleven examiners work from one
to two days per week and are paid from $13,281 to $16,832 per year. Final Report, supra note
3, at 39-41.
62. The Department of Agriculture does not hold many hearings; it only requires one part-
time hearing officer. Id. at 6-8.
63. Id. at 23-32.
64. Id. at 44.
65. See id. at 25.
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-l(b)(3) (West 1974) and the regulations promulgated thereunder
and codified at 42 C.F.R. § 100.106(c)(2) (1976) require that hearing officers must be ap-
pointed by the governor or his designee but must not be employees of the Health Department.
The Department of Justice has been designated by the governor to provide hearing officers
in these situations, and it has compiled a list of individuals who are qualified to conduct this
type of hearing. A problem is that hearing officers may be subject to local pressures to decide
a case in favor of the institution.
67. In the past, the Department of Public Welfare employed hearing officers on an annual
salary, but permitted them to maintain an outside private practice. As a result of the consent
decree entered in Marsden v. Beal, No. 75-714 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (unpublished opinion), the
Department of Public Welfare must afford a hearing as well as a decision by a hearing
examiner which must be reviewed within ten days by the secretary or his designee in all cases
involving termination of any benefits administered by the Department. In order to implement
the consent decree, the Secretary of Public Welfare created a Hearing and Appeals Unit
which supplies the hearing officers for all departmental hearings. The Unit's executive direc-
tor has been designated by the secretary as the final decision-maker of the Department. The
unit is moving toward creating a cadre of hearing officers (both lawyers and ponlawyers) who
will devote full time to their duties.
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of the hearing system previously used by the Public Utility Commis-
sion did not meet the due process requirements of the United States
and Pennsylvania Constitutions,"8 legislation has been passed to
improve the PUC's hearing system;"9 administrative law judges now
hear cases and write recommended decisions.70
The qualifications of hearing officers vary widely, depending upon
the agency involved. Although most agencies require their hearing
officers to be lawyers, some do not. For example, many referees in
unemployment compensation cases are nonlawyers, although the
referees who are not lawyers usually have had long experience
within the Bureau of Employment Security.7' Pennsysylvania's
Labor Relations Board also utilizes some nonlawyers as hearing
officers, but these nonlawyers usually have had extensive experience
with the National Labor Relations Board.12 Most hearings within
the Department of Education are conducted by lawyers, but those
cases concerning the placement of retarded children in special edu-
cation classes are heard by nonlawyers" because of a frequent ina-
bility to locate lawyers who have extensive knowledge and creden-
tials in the area of special education. The Board of Probation and
Parole" and the Bureau of Traffic Safety of the Department of
Transportation75 also utilize nonlawyers to conduct hearings. The
recent trend, as illustrated by amendments to the Public Utility
Law requiring administrative law judges to be lawyers for a mini-
68. See cases cited in notes 34, 37 & 43 supra. But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975).
69.. Act No. 216, § 7, 1976 Pa. Laws 1075 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 457.2
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978)). This Act establishes a system of administrative law judges for
the Public Utility Commission, provides for a code of ethics, and sets the minimum qualifica-
tions for such judges. When the Commissioners do not preside over a hearing themselves, the
presiding officer must initially decide the case unless the Commission, by general rule or on
an ad hoc basis, requires the entire record to be certified to it for a decision. The Act also
provides that the recommended decision of the administrative law judge, which must include
findings, conclusions, and the reasons therefor, shall be part of the record.
70. The Pennsylvania Superior Court had held that a Public Utility Commission exam-
iner was not authorized to file a report or make recommendations. He was only permitted
such duties as administering oaths, examining witnesses, and receiving evidence. J. Benkart
& Sons v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. Ct. 5, 11, 7 A.2d 584, 587 (1939)
(Keller, P.J., concurring).
71. Final Report, supra note 3, at 49.
72. Id. at 89.
73. Id. at 30.
74. Id. at 58, 89.
75. Id. at 74.
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mum of three years," is for attorneys to conduct hearings.
Hearing officers' powers also vary from agency to agency. Until
recently, hearing officers with the Public Utility Commission could
not even make recommendations; they merely presided over the
hearings and ruled on the admissibility of evidence." At the other
end of the spectrum, hearing officers in workmen's compensation"
and unemployment compensation79 cases render decisions that are
final unless appealed.
Where the hearing officer has no formal decision-making author-
ity, the parties may not even be aware that the officer has made a
recommendation. The state Labor Relations Board seems to have
recognized the difficulty that the inability to utilize hearing officers'
recommendations presents to the parties. After reviewing recom-
mendations of its hearing officers, the Board implements a proce-
dure in which it issues nisi decisions and then permits the parties
to request oral argument before the Board after reviewing those
decisions. If no argument is requested, the nisi decisions become
final.8 0
III. PROBLEMS OF PRESENT PRACTICES
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has signifi-
cantly broadened the contexts in which parties are entitled to ad-
ministrative hearings8" and the importance of fair hearings in the
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 457.2(c)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
77. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
78. Decisions of workmen's compensation referees are final unless an appeal is taken
within 20 days from the receipt of notice of the decision. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 853 (Purdon
1952 & Supp. 1977-1978) (occupational injury); id. § 1523 (occupational disease). On appeal,
the Board may hear more evidence, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 854, 1525 (Purdon 1952 & Supp.
1977-1978), but § 854, governing occupational injury and disease cases, prevents the Board
from disregarding findings of fact by the referees if they are supported by "competent"
evidence. In line with that provision, it has been established that, without taking new evi-
dence, the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board may not depart from the findings of fact
made by the referees. See Kimbob Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 12 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 92, 315 A.2d 304 (1974); Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Krawczynski, 9 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 176, 305 A.2d 757 (1973); Final Report, supra note 3, at 53.
79. Unemployment compensation referees' decisions are final and binding unless ap-
pealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. However, rule 200 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review provides that the Board
may on its own motion review a case that a referee has decided. 34 Pa. Code § 101.101. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 824 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). This power is infrequently exercised.
Final Report, supra note 3, at 49.
80. Final Report, supra note 3, at 43.
81. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
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administrative process has been recognized by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. 2 Since adjudicatory hearings play an increasingly
important role in the administrative process and the administrative
bureaucracy continues to play a constantly expanding role in so-
ciety, the problems of the present system must be recognized and
rectified.
One aspect of the present system that needs improving is the
general supervision of hearing officers. Although there are some ex-
ceptions,8 3 hearing officers generally are supervised, if at all, by
individuals who are involved in the substantive decision-making
process of the agency. For example, at the Labor Relations Board
and the Liquor Control Board, the executive director or general
counsel supervises the hearing officers." Such a situation creates a
possibility that an officer's decision may be influenced by a desire
to please his superior. Even though most hearing officers may make
their decisions on the basis of the facts before them, it would be
better to isolate the decision-making process from the substantive
work of the agency. It is not necessarily an evil that substantive
agency employees are involved in the supervision of hearing officers,
but the appearance of fairness would be increased without such a
relationship.
When an agency has too few hearings to justify the hiring of
several full-time hearing officers, the hiring of a person to supervise
the hearing officers seems unnecessary and wasteful. As a result,
hearing officers who render decisions for such agencies are super-
vised, if at all, by people who have other substantive duties. This
problem, which is inescapable under the present system of hearing
officers in Pennsylvania, may result in the utilization of hearing
officers who are not particularly competent since no one is given the
direct responsibility of evaluating the officers' work. When a hearing
officer performs poorly, such performance stands out and the serv-
ices of that hearing officer probably will be terminated. However, if
the hearing officer performs marginally, the agency may use the
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Compare Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). But
see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
82. See Conestoga Nat'l Bank v. Patterson, 442 Pa. 289, 275 A.2d 6 (1971).
83. Both the Workmen's Compensation Board and Unemployment Compensation Board
employ individuals whose primary function is the supervision of the referees. See Final
Report, supra note 3, at 93.
84. Id.
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same officer again without questioning his or her capability. Even
if an agency were to make an effort to supervise part-time hearing
officers, it is doubtful that the skills and talents of people holding
hearings part-time can be polished as well as those who are full-time
career adjudicators.
A hearing officer should not have a bias toward the agency. When
a particular policy has not been enunciated or when a policy is not
clear, the parties to a proceeding should have the benefit of a deci-
sion by a hearing officer based upon a fair and unbiased appraisal
of arguments that have been made."5 All open questions should not
automatically be decided in the favor of the agency. A hearing offi-
cer's recommendation, too, must be viewed from the perspective of
fairness. Recommended decisions, when adopted by agencies, will
be seen to have great weight; where the parties did not get to argue
before the agency head, their presentation to the hearing officer may
be the parties' only input in the decisional process.
It is questionable whether impartiality prevails when agencies use
their own personnel to conduct hearings.81 In the Department of
Labor and Industry, hearings in prevailing wage cases are prose-
cuted by staff attorneys who act as hearing officers in similar cases.87
The Insurance Department has its staff attorneys prosecute the
same kinds of cases as those in which the attorneys act as hearing
officers. 8 Even though these assistant attorneys general attempt to
refrain from discussing the different cases with each other, human
nature being what it is, there is certainly no guarantee that they are
successful. As a result, a prosecutor can indirectly exert undue influ-
ence when his or her colleague is the hearing officer. Other examples
of such commingling practices abound. The executive director and
85. Not only must a decision be fair in fact, but the appearance of fairness may be crucial.
See Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 129-30, 252 A.2d 704, 706 (1969).
86. In Pennsylvania, such a commingling of functions by the agencies would often appear
to amount to a denial of due process. See cases cited in note 34 supra and text accompanying
notes 34-41 supra. In a closely related circumstance, a recent decision of the Insurance Com-
missioner was reversed because the associate chief counsel who conducted the hearing was
the direct supervisor of the associate counsel who prosecuted the case for the Department.
Commonwealth Dep't of Ins. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d
874 (1976) (petition for allowance of appeal to Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted January
31, 1977).
87. Final Report, supra note 3, at 44-45.
88. Id. at 37. It is questionable whether this practice will continue after the decision in
Commonwealth Dep't of Ins. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d
874 (1976). See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
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general counsel of the State Harness Racing Commission both con-
duct hearings and occasionally make recommendations to the Com-
mission.8 9 In the Department of Banking, a departmental staff
member acts as a hearing officer whenever one is required. 0 In the
Department of Education,' teacher tenure cases are prosecuted and
heard by the Department's relatively small staff of assistant attor-
neys general; these same attorneys have the responsibility of advis-
ing local school boards concerning the rights of tenured teachers and
the procedures for their dismissal." Although the attorneys un-
doubtedly attempt to avoid conflict in particular cases, the mixing
of functions in these agencies may violate due process; at best, it
seems unwise. In view of the recent judicial decisions in Pennsyl-
vania involving contacts and relationships between those presenting
the state's case and the decision-makers, 3 it would seem appropri-
ate to take steps to separate hearing officers from other agency staff
members.
Some agencies use non-Commonwealth employees as hearing offi-
cers. Usually these persons are attorneys with their own private
practices. A basic problem of hiring hearing officers on an ad hoc
basis, however, is that they may be hired with a particular outcome
in mind. Moreover, such hearing officers, in order to increase their
chance of being hired for similar cases in the future, may tend to
rule in favor of the agency. Obviously, these practices can create an
appearance of unfairness which would violate the principles enunci-
ated in Gardner v. Repasky. " In order to obviate this problem, some
agencies, such as the Department of Health, have had hearing offi-
cers appointed by an outside authority. 5 The Department of Educa-
tion, in school busing and state aid cases, requests the assistance of
the Department of Justice in the appointment of hearing officers."
Although this method is a great deal better than having the agency
appoint hearing officers itself, there may still be a problem of lack
89. Final Report, supra note 3, at 22.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id. at 23-32.
93. See, e.g., Commonwealth Dep't of Ins. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 26 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976) (petition for allowance of appeal to Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted January 31, 1977); cases cited in note 34 supra.
94. 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
95. See note 66 supra.
96. Final Report, supra note 3, at 26-29.
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of independence since the Justice Department attorneys who make
the appointments are also responsible for giving legal advice to the
agency and, in addition, are often required to approve the adjudica-
tions of the agency.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
Although we think that the present system of providing hearing
officers can best be improved by the establishment of a central office
for hearing officers, it is necessary to discuss the various alternative
systems that have been considered and rejected. These alternatives
range from a variety of partial central office systems to a general
statutory scheme setting forth broad guidelines for the utilization,
powers, and qualifications of hearing officers.
The current system could no doubt be improved by the enactment
of a statute that would set forth minimum standards for all hearing
officers. The separation of functions within each agency-
preventing hearing officers from prosecuting and hearing similar
kinds of cases within the same agency-could be mandated. To
satisfy due process, the statute could contain a prohibition con-
cerning the commingling of the investigatory, prosecutorial, and
hearing functions. The same individual could be prohibited from
prosecuting a case and giving legal advice to the decision-maker.
The statute could contain the minimum qualifications of all persons
who are authorized to conduct hearings in Pennsylvania. A basic
requirement might be that all hearing officers must be lawyers ex-
cept in situations where a person with special skills not readily
found in a lawyer could conduct a particular class of hearings. Or,
the statute could require that before a person is employed as a
hearing officer he must pass a test prepared by the state Civil Serv-
ice Commission to ensure that the applicant would have the basic
skills necessary for conducting a hearing.
A statute requiring applicants to qualify by means of a competi-
tive examination would make available a pool of individuals from
which an agency could choose; it would also leave a great deal of
discretion in the agencies to choose who they wanted. As we see it,
there is a need for discretion in the selection and assignment of
hearing officers, but, because of the need for fairness in an adjudica-
tory process in which the government agency plays an adversary as
well as a decisional role, that discretion should not remain in the
agency.
Vol. 15: 605
Hearing Officers
Another statutory requirement might be a limitation upon the
number of part-time hearing officers a particular agency could em-
ploy, coupled with the requirement that all part-time hearing offi-
cers meet the same qualifications as full-time hearing officers. In
order to encourage compliance, the statute might contain a provi-
sion that would render void any adjudication not heard by a quali-
fied hearing officer. The statute could also require periodic reports
by each agency and by each hearing officer, conveying such informa-
tion as the number of cases heard, time of disposition, appeals
taken, and other relevant matters
The basic problem with a general statutory scheme controlling
the use, powers, and qualifications of hearing examiners is that
different agencies have different needs. It would seem inappropriate
to require an individual who hears relatively simple automobile
driver license revocation hearings to have the same qualifications as
an individual who hears complicated Public Utilities Commission
rate cases. Thus, we conclude that because of the wide variety of
hearings conducted in Pennsylvania, a general statute would be a
great improvement upon the present system, but would not render
certain a fundamentally fair hearing with the appearance of impar-
tiality while maintaining the necessary administrative efficiency.
A partial central office system to provide hearing officers to
some-but not all-agencies could also be established. Varieties of
such a system range from the kind where a central office provides
all hearing officers whenever they are needed to one where the cen-
tral office has a few hearing officers that are provided to agencies
that require hearing officers only on rare occasions. Illustrative of
the latter kind of partial central office system is the Missouri alter-
native which requires that occupational licensing hearings are to be
held by an Administrative Hearing Commission. 7 Even though li-
censing boards maintain the final decision-making responsibility,
all hearings involving occupational licenses are heard by one hearing
commissioner.
Another possibility is to establish a central office that would pro-
vide hearing officers only to those agencies that do not have a suffi-
cient number of hearings to warrant employing their own. Such a
97. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § § 161.252-.342 (Vernon Supp. 1977); Special Project, Fair Treat-
ment for the Licensed Professional: The Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 37
Mo. L. RFv. 410 (1972).
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system would solve the basic problem of availability of hearing ex-
aminers and eliminate the need to use part-time officers. Agencies
could elect to use hearing officers supplied by the central office, or,
if they were so inclined, they could employ their own. California
once utilized a variation of such a system." It was not very success-
ful; a by-product of the arrangement was competition between cen-
tral office hearing officers and agency hearing officers.9 Thus, in
1961, California began to require that all hearings under its Admin-
istrative Procedure Act be conducted by hearing officers supplied by
the central office.'00 Although the new California system appears to
be broad in coverage, it is in reality a partial system.0 ' Florida has
also adopted a partial, central office system." 2 And, legislation re-
98. See N. ABRAMS, DESIGNING A STATE HEARING OFFICER SYSTEM: ISSUES SUGGESTED BY THE
CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE 3-4, 14 (1974) (study prepared for the Center for Administrative
Justice, American Bar Association) [hereinafter cited as ABRAMS].
99. One author who studied the arrangement concluded:
[Tihe experience in California suggests that as a long-term system it had serious
weaknesses. As previously described, central panel hearing officers under the hybrid
system in California were at an automatic disadvantage in the competitive situation
into which they were thrust, and this disadvantage undoubtedly affected morale and
may have subtly influenced decisions.
Id. at 35.
100. Id. at 5; see generally Clarkson, The History of the California Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Clarkson].
101. Abrams describes its coverage as follows:
At present there are about 20 hearing officers handling all APA hearings in the State,
covering the adjudicative activities of approximately 56 agencies. Most such agencies
primarily perform licensing functions but others . . . are also included within APA
coverage. There are a total of approximately 350 hearing officers or the equivalent
working in the State. Most are referees who conduct hearings for the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission in workmen's compensation matters; about 20 are attached to the
Public Utilities Commission. The existing central panel system in California thus does
not include within its coverage the great majority of hearing officers.
ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 5-6 (emphasis supplied).
102. Florida's "central office" system excludes from its coverage the following:
1. Hearings before agency heads or a member thereof other than an agency head
or a member of an agency head within the Department of Professional and Occupa-
tional Regulation;
2. Hearings before the Industrial Relations Commission, judges of industrial
claims, unemployment compensation appeals referees, and the Public Service Com-
mission or its examiners;
3. Hearings regarding drivers' licensing pursuant to chapter 322;
4. Hearings conducted within the Department of Health and Rehabilitation Serv-
ices in the execution of those social and economic programs administered by the former
Division of Family Services of said department prior to the reorganization effected by
chapter 75-48, Laws of Florida;
5. Hearings in which the division is a party, in which case, an attorney assigned
by the Administration Commission shall be the hearing officer;
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cently introduced in New Jersey would establish a central office for
hearing officers but would exclude from its coverage rate-making
proceedings and proceedings before the state's Board of Parole, the
Public Employment Relations Commission, the Board of Educa-
tion, the Board of Higher Education, and retirement systems in the
Division of Pensions.1 3
6. Hearings which involve student disciplinary suspensions or expulsions and
which are conducted by educational units; and
7. Hearings of the Public Employees Relations Commission in which a determina-
tion is made of the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, as provided in § 447.307.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1)(a) (West Supp. 1977).
103. N.J. Senate Bill 1811, 197th Legis., 1st Sess. (1976) (introduced by Senator Garra-
mone). The full list of agency exclusions is set forth in § 9 of the bill as follows:
9. (New section) Unless a specific request is made by the agency, no hearing officer
shall be assigned by the director to hear contested cases with respect to:
a. The State Board of Parole, the Public Employment Relations Commission, the
Division of Workers' Compensation, the Division of Tax Appeals, or to any agency not
within section 2(a) of P.L. 1968, c. 410 (C. 52:14B-2(a));
b. Any matter which requires an en banc administrative adjudication but which
is permitted to be and is to be conducted by one or several of multiple members of
the agency, including but not limited to the Civil Service Commission, the Public
Utilities Commission, the Board of Education, the Board of Higher Education, or any
retirement system in the Division of Pensions in the Department of the Treasury;
c. Any matter where the head of the agency determines to conduct the hearing
directly and individually; or
d. Any agency for the adoption, amendment or repeal of any administrative rule,
including the adoption, amendment or repeal of any rate, toll, fare or charge for a
product or service provided by any business, industry or utility regulated or controlled
by the agency.
Appended to the bill is a statement, part of which offers the reasons for the creation of a
central office:
Presently, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that all contested cases involv-
ing State agencies be heard by a hearing officer. The existing system of part-time
hearing officers has caused delay in the disposition of cases, and unnecessary expense
to the State. In many instances, the Attorney General experiences difficulty defending
in court the hearing officer reports, as adopted by the agency head, because they are
not expertly prepared. Further, hearing officers employed by the various agencies
involved in the decisions being rendered are often not impartial, an ill created in part
by the fact that the agency head selected them in the first place. The concept of due
process of law is also undermined by the combination of investigative, prosecutorial
and hearing functions, all being administered by the same agency and sometimes by
the same individual. Finally, the employment by the State of part-time hearing offi-
cers who are attorneys representing clients before other State agencies raises serious
issues under the conflicts of interest law, because paid hearing officers, even those
serving part-time, are State officers or employees subject to the most stringent con-
flicts law requirements.
The statement also says that the bill incorporates concepts first used by Justice Nathan L.
Jacobs in his dissenting opinion in Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 536, 105 A.2d 545, 566-
67 (1954). There, Justice Jacobs referred, inter alia, to a legislative proposal that would have
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There are several advantages to a partial central office. If, for
example, some agencies use central office hearing officers and others
use their own hearing officers, competition may result in superior
decisions. Also, agencies which do not need full-time hearing officers
will have a readily available pool to serve their needs. A partial
central office is based on the same concept as a central office, and
to the extent that states have adopted a partial central office they
can be seen as moving toward the development of an independent
central system. Yet, a totally centralized system seems far more
advantageous for providing fundamentally fair hearings.
V. CENTRAL OFFICE FOR HEARING OFFICERS
A. Reasons for a Central Office
In addition to providing highly skilled, independent hearing offi-
cers to conduct adjudicatory hearings, other improvements would
result from a central hearing officer system. By treating the hearing
function as a separate and important function of the government,
and by creating a career service and established corps devoted to
conducting administrative hearings, the establishment of a central
office would increase the quality of hearings and recommended deci-
sions. Thus, we feel that Pennsylvania should adopt a system in
which hearing officers employed by, and responsible to, a central
office would conduct the adjudicatory proceedings held by the state
agencies.
The most apparent benefit of such an office would be that it could
supply trained hearing officers to agencies whose caseloads do not
require the services of full-time hearing examiners. This would
avoid the use of agency legal staffs and their appearance of partial-
ity, and employment of part-time hearing officers and outside law-
yers who may be inexperienced. Instead, agencies would receive
trained hearing officers who could be expected to conduct fair hear-
ings and to write good initial decisions. For agencies that now em-
ploy their own full-time hearing officers, other gains would result
from the establishment of a career service. The agencies would be
provided for "an independent corps of hearers who would not be subordinate to the heads of
administrative agencies .... " He then said, "there are those who believe that without a
corps of independent hearers, or a comparable substantive device, the basic problem will not
be met despite such procedural gloss as may be imposed from time to time."
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freed of the need to handle personnel matters pertaining to the
hearing officers, and hopefully, there would be an overall improve-
ment in the adjudicatory process.
By placing all hearing officers in a single administrative unit, it
would be possible to create an environment in which hearing officers
could gradually acquire a high degree of skill in conducting adminis-
trative hearings. Within state government, the different kinds of
hearings required vary in complexity; through efficient handling of
assignments by the central office, hearing officers could be assigned
to conduct hearings so that the more difficult cases would go to the
more experienced officers, while beginning officers are allowed to
become acquainted with procedures. Furthermore, the prospect of
going beyond a single area, and developing an ability to handle a
variety of hearings might well create a more appealing career oppor-
tunity. Although for reasons discussed below it may be desirable to
have hearing officers assigned to a particular agency for extended
periods of time, the advantage of having such special expertise de-
velop in some areas may be outweighed by the inertia that may
result from years of conducting a single kind of hearing and the
accompanying perception that the hearings have become repetitive
routine. Where such staleness sets in, the quality of work may dim-
inish even if the actual output continues at a satisfactory level.
A government-wide career service for hearing officers might be
attractive to some attorneys who might not otherwise consider such
a career since a central office could initiate more extensive recruit-
ing procedures than any one agency. Moreover, a central office re-
sponsible for a large number of hearing officers would also be able
to conduct more sophisticated training programs than could a single
agency. With regard to taking advantage of training programs given
by other institutions, a central office, with control over a substantial
number of hearing officers, would have more flexibility in rotating
assignments and thus may be able to facilitate leaves for advanced
study and other developmental exercises.
It would be expected that a central office would make possible
continuing review of the work of its hearing officers. Not only could
the office monitor output, but it could exercise a fair degree of
criticism of the conduct of hearings and of the quality of officers'
decisions. In performing this function, a central office would not be
in the institutional position of desiring a particular result and, even
more importantly, would not be seen by the public to be influencing
outcomes in the way that such supervision by the substantive
1977
Duquesne Law Review
agency might appear to do. The central office would have only an
institutional interest in the improvement of adjudicatory hearings.
It could study the operation of administrative process and make
recommendations for its improvement.
B. Problems with Independent Hearing Officers
Although the independence of hearing officers is one of the main
advantages of a central office system, such independence can also
be seen as a disadvantage. After examining a federal program that
temporarily transferred hearing officers from one agency to another,
one commentator stated that "[tihe borrowed examiner has no
special commitment to the successful achievement of the goals of
that agency to which he is temporarily assigned."'' 4 Perhaps a sys-
tem in which an officer is borrowed from one substantive agency by
another does not serve as a good example for identifying the possible
attitudes of central office hearing examiners. Nevertheless, the ex-
perience may give some idea of the nature of the problems that
result from a hearing officer occupying a position independent from
the agency for whom he or she conducts hearings. It has been also
noted:
The borrowed examiner approaches his case with an attitude
significantly different from that of an examiner sitting within
his own agency-an attitude closer to that of an appellate court
than of one who is "acting for the head of the agency." For
better or worse, his decision is somewhat less of an "agency
decision," with the cohesiveness of purpose which that phrase
implies; and somewhat more of an objective judicial determi-
nation, giving the agency the benefit of no legal doubts, in-
serted at the very outset of the administrative process. 5
In California, where a central office system to conduct hearings
for its licensing agencies and its Department of Social Welfare and
the Commissioner of Corporations 0 is used, a hearing officer in the
central office described those hearing officers as "fiercely indepen-
dent," ' 7 and pointed out that there was a tendency for an atmos-
104. Scalia, The Hearing Examiner Loan Program, 1971 DUKE L.J. 319, 354.
105. Id. at 355.
106. ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 5-6. See generally Clarkson, supra note 100.
107. Coan, Operational Aspects of a Central Hearing Examiners Pool: California's
Experiences, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 86, 91 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Coan].
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phere of antagonism to develop on the part of the agencies, espe-
cially where the agencies are licensing bodies controlled by the busi-
nesses or professions being regulated. °
When examined in the context of the function of the hearing
officers, however, conflict between the independent hearing officer
and the agency should not appear to be acute. The function of the
hearing officer is to determine facts, to apply the law to those facts,
and, where necessary to a decision, to make policy determinations
that are in keeping with the overall policy set by the agency. For
the most part, agencies will have the final authority to reverse the
hearing officers in any individual case. Hearing officers sit to apply
the policy formulated by an agency. They do not make policy, ex-
cept insofar as policy judgments necessary to decide a particular
case have not already been made by the agency. Professor Norman
Abrams acknowledged:
The agency may be concerned lest the hearing officer be so
independent that his decisions are inconsistent with agency
policy. That concern suggests a basic tension in the adminis-
trative process-between the notion that in deciding cases
hearing officers should be independent of the agency and at the
same time should, in some sense, be an arm of the agency and
reflect its policy. We usually resolve that tension by distin-
guishing between agency influence upon the hearing officer in
the individual case, deemed impermissible, and hearing officer
adherence to general policies of the agency which is deemed not
only acceptable but desirable. 09
The problem really is not one of containing the officio us intermed-
dler, but rather one of communication between the agency and the
hearing officers. The problem is somewhat complicated by the fact
that outside parties are involved and that policy articulated by an
administrative agency amounts to law.
Abrams did find that "hearing officers under a central panel sys-
tem may find it more difficult to keep abreast of agency policies.""'
In an attempt to deal with this problem in California, licensing
agencies have furnished the central office with memoranda stating
108. Id. at 89.
109. ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 8.
110. Id. at 7.
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their policies, and these memoranda are made available to the hear-
ing officers.'' The memoranda "are only guidelines to the thinking
of the agency and in no way [are] binding upon the hearing offi-
cers,""' 2 but at least one hearing officer in California has recognized
that since these policy statements appear to be rules of general
application, perhaps they should be adopted as regulations."3 The
point is that agencies should be encouraged to articulate their poli-
cies. To the extent that agencies expect hearing officers to conform
their decisions to agency policy, agencies should embody that policy
in regulations.
In addition, hearing officers must presumably follow prior deci-
sions of the agency. Since it makes very little sense to have decisions
that are so independent of agency policy that they require reversal
by the agency, hearing officers, as far as possible, should apply the
policy that the agency establishes. Expertise and experience is re-
quired to understand and apply the policy, so familiarity with
agency goals, especially where agency regulations may be somewhat
complex, is a definite virtue. Latitude given to hearing officers is
substantial only in those areas where the agency has not formulated
its policy in regulations or decisions. But it is in precisely these areas
that parties expect the examiners to hear and seriously consider
their arguments and the parties should be afforded an opportunity
to make whatever record might be necessary to support those argu-
ments.
We suggest that one way to combine independence with the nec-
essary understanding of agency policy is to place the hearing officers
in a central office, but assign the officers to cases of single agencies
for extended periods of time. In this manner they can acquire the
expertise necessary for the efficient handling of cases, and at the
same time can maintain the requisite distance from the agency.
Supervision would still come from an outside agency. The director
of the central office would remain responsible for the career ad-
vancement of the hearing officer and he could handle situations,
were they to arise, in which an officer became so attached to an
agency that he was no longer able to make independent determina-
tions of factual and other open issues. Even where an agency had
111. Coan, supra note 107, at 89.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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an insufficient volume of cases to justify employment of a full-time
hearing officer, if the same person were assigned to that agency to
conduct hearings, there would be a development of expertise.
Another possible difficulty arising from having hearing officers
located in a central office is that since they would be less known to
the agencies, the agencies might be less willing to adopt their deci-
sions." 4 To the extent that hearing officers heard cases for the same
agency for an extended period of time, this, too, would be remedied.
In order to assure the integrity of the decisional process, and to
avoid any appearance that scheduling is done by agencies to achieve
particular substantive results through the selection of hearing offi-
cers, scheduling authority must lie with the central office. The in-
sertion of an outside agency's scheduling machinery into the agency
decision-making process could result in scheduling that is slower
and not as responsive to an agency's needs than if the agency itself
had full control over scheduling." 5 The "question to be faced is
whether the loss in control over scheduling and resulting delays are
worth the gain of insuring the independence of the hearing offi-
cer.""' 6 Although there may be increased delays, we feel that they
are worth the advantage of independence. We, of course, anticipate
that, along with the impartiality resulting from the central office
system, will come improved decision-making by hearing officers
generally.
C. Description of the Central Office
A central office, perhaps called the Office of Administrative Hear-
ings, should be under the supervision and control of a single person,
the Director of Administrative Hearings, and should be an indepen-
dent agency. The director should be appointed by the governor for
a term of six years and should be removable for cause. If the agency
is to be effective, a strong administrator must be in charge. He
should be in a position to resist agency pressures that might compro-
mise, or appear to compromise, the neutrality of the hearing offi-
cers. To support the director's independence, the statute creating
the office should contain restrictions on the director's participation
in outside activities, including the usual restriction on political ac-
114. Id.
115. See ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 29.
116. Id. at 30.
1977
Duquesne Law Review
tivities applicable to all civil service employees." 7
The director should have full power over personnel matters. Thus,
he or she should have the authority to employ, supervise, promote,
suspend, demote, and remove hearing officers and other employees
in accordance with generally applicable civil service provisions. In
cooperation with the Civil Service Commission and the Executive
Board," '8 the director should set appropriate classifications and
employment requirements for the hearing officers.
To assist the hearing officers, the central office should hire sup-
porting personnel, including official reporters and secretaries. Such
personnel should be employed by the central office so that the hear-
ing officers will not be dependent on the agencies for these necessary
services. Similarly, the central office should include office space for
the hearing officers. Were hearing officers assigned to occupy offices
within the agencies themselves, there might be an undue appear-
ance of impermissible contact.
The central office would assign hearing officers to hear cases and
would supervise the scheduling of hearings. An equally important
function of the central office would be the supervision and career
development of the officers. Many of the advantages that are possi-
ble under a central office system will depend on the importance
which the office attributes to training and development of the offi-
cers.
A central office might work with individual hearing officers and
conduct group courses with a view toward improving skills in presid-
ing at hearings and writing decisions. The office could also plan
programs to address problems that might prevent hearing officers
from performing well. It might concern itself with the reporting of
new agency decisions, or with other means of informing the hearing
officers of the policy positions taken by the agencies. Because we feel
that the office, if it were functioning as we envisage, would necessar-
ily become aware of defects in the process of administrative adjudi-
cation, we think that the central office should have the authority
and financial ability to undertake studies of administrative law and
procedure.
117. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.904 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
118. The Executive Board, which consists of the governor and six administrative de-
partment heads designated by him or her, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 64 (Purdon 1962), has
certain powers over the salaries and classifications of Commonwealth employees. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.707 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
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D. Hearing Officers
We hesitate to suggest any rigid qualifications for hearing officers
in the belief that these should be worked out by the director of the
central office in consultation with the various agencies who will
utilize the officers. Some general comments may be made, however,
about the nature of the position and some of the issues that might
arise with regard to qualifications.
Since a good adjudicator can minimize conflicts between parties,
the officer should have a well-developed sense of how to deal with
people and should be sensitive to the positions of individuals in an
administrative dispute. While some hearings involve matters that
justify sophisticated representation, many administrative hearings
involve controversies that are small in dollar amount and concern
people who are not knowledgeable about administrative procedures
and practices. An adjudicator who intelligently handles the prob-
lems that parties face in the administrative process stands to in-
crease respect for government and at the same time facilitate the
handling of cases. Thus, prime qualifications for such officers in-
clude sensitivity, patience, and intelligence. These attributes may
develop from experience in dealing with people from a variety of
backgrounds.
It may prove necessary to hire people with substantial experience
in particular substantive areas related to certain types of hearings.
Without a doubt, a solid background in the substantive area which
is the focus of a hearing goes a long way toward permitting someone
to become a good adjudicator, especially where the hearings require
expertise in specialized material. Ne'vertheless, even in many com-
plicated areas, a good adjudicator, even though unfamiliar with the
area, may be able to grasp the material with sufficient understand-
ing to make a good decision. Given our recommendation that hear-
ing officers be assigned to particular agencies for substantial periods
of time, it might be possible to make good use of generalists who
subsequently develop specialized knowledge. The controversy over
whether to use generalists who develop the expertise in the course
of conducting hearings or experts in particular substantive areas,
however, appears to be a continuing one in the discussion of neces-
sary qualifications for hearing officers."' Of course, in any hearing
119. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 58-60; Lakusta, Operations in an Agency Not
Subject to the APA: Public Utilities Commission, 44 CAUF. L. REv. 218, 226 (1956). Lakusta
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officer system, demands for hearing officers must be met with the
available personnel. While we feel that the best approach would be
to develop a pool of hearing officers who, by careful assignment,
would gain expertise in the areas in which hearings had to be held,
we think that flexibility is important and that there may be a need
to recruit specialists in certain areas. This need to use specialists
may be more acute in the early stages of the operation of the central
office. Actions taken in the transition period must not, however,
impede the long-range development of a central office where hearing
officers sharpen their skills as adjudicators beyond any special ex-
pertise necessary in particular areas.
In addition to hiring people who have had substantial experience,
the office should also hire recent law school graduates who could
become initiated through the simpler types of hearings and grad-
ually develop adjudicative skills. In this context, we might suggest
that long experience as an effective legal practitioner, may, but does
not necessarily, make one qualified to perform well as an adjudica-
tor.120
Closely related to the issue of specialization is the question of
whether all hearing officers should be lawyers. California requires
that hearing officers must have practiced law in California for at
least five years.' 2' Florida requires that, prior to employment, a
hearing officer must have been a member of the Florida Bar for
three years.2 2 Although the Florida statute does permit the director
of the central office to appoint nonlawyers to conduct hearings, he
discussed this point in the course of dealing with California's requirement that hearing offi-
cers be admitted to practice law in the state. He said:
On the other hand, it was argued that the technical nature of much of the Commis-
sion's work justifies the employment of engineers, rate experts and accountants as
examiners, presumably upon the theory that attorneys might find undue difficulty in
technical fields.-While every lawyer would no doubt rise to champion the ability of the
legal profession to master the most esoteric subject of human knowledge sufficiently
to perform the hearing and judging function, and would point to the long tradition of
the judiciary in that respect, practical considerations of incumbency and historical
precedent proved the deciding factor. Several non-lawyers who are technically trained
men with previous experience in examining were blanketed into the office of chief
examiner.
Id. (footnote omitted).
120. It is relevant to note here that in some legal systems judges are recruited directly
out of law school rather than from the practicing bar. See, e.g., R. DAVID & H.P. DEVRIES,
THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 18 (1958).
121. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11502 (West Supp. 1977).
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65(2) (West Supp. 1977).
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may only do so if he also appoints a lawyer "to assist in the conduct
of the hearing and to rule upon proffers of proof, questions of evi-
dence, disposition of procedural requests, and similar matters."'' 3
Certainly, instances can be cited in which nonlawyers conducted
hearings well. One scholar, after studying similar types of hearings
conducted by lawyers and social workers, concluded that social
workers were more desirable adjudicators,' 4 but the conclusions
drawn from the data in that study have been criticized.'1 At any
rate, the study dealt with hearings in which the individual parties
were not ordinarily represented by counsel.'" Where parties are rep-
resented by attorneys, it is not impossible for nonlawyers to do a
good job as hearing officers; lawyers, however, may more readily
understand some of the tactics used by other lawyers. Counsel's
methods may appear impolite or needlessly dilatory to nonlawyers
even though they may be necessary to protect a client's rights; on
the other hand, unnecessary delays or subterfuges also may be more
readily identifiable by another attorney.
Where there is no representation of the parties, the hearing officer
may have "to aid the claimant in presenting his evidence and testi-
mony and in ferreting out and formulating the issues."' Although
a nonlawyer well-versed in the applicable rules and regulations
might be able to do this, it may be more easily handled by a lawyer
presiding. A way to minimize disparities would be to have nonlaw-
yers "undergo a short-term paraprofessional training program to
familiarize them with the different aspects of the hearing officer's
job."'2 As with the area specialization problem, the issue is hard to
resolve definitively. We suspect that the focus should be on the
qualifications of the particular individual conducting the hear-
ings-how well he has come to know the material involved, and has
developed adjudicatory skills. As mentioned earlier, the practice of
law itself does not assure possession of adjudicatory skills. Never-
123. Id. § 120.65(4).
124. tenBroek, Operations Partially Subject to the APA: Public Welfare Administration,
44 CAmF. L. REv. 242, 248 (1956) [hereinafter cited as tenBroek].
125. ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 58-60.
126. tenBroek, supra note 124, at 244.
127. Id. at 248.
128. ABRAMS, supra note 98, at 60. Abrams concluded: "In the final analysis, the choice
between requiring legal training for general panel hearing officers or introducing a type of
paraprofessional depends on how judicial one views the hearing officer's function to be, and
how large is the available pool of potential lawyer hearing officers." Id.
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theless, it is probably true that in formulating a general rule de-
signed to identify those most likely to develop such skills, the re-
quirement of formal legal training makes a lot of sense. We think,
therefore, that, generally, hearing officers should be lawyers, but
that the director should have the power to make exceptions where
it would be desirable to utilize people without law degrees and with
particular expertise.
We also think that it is important that hearing officers be full-
time employees of the state and that they be free from conflicts of
interest. The major innovation of a central office would be to culti-
vate a corps of trained, experienced adjudicators. Such a develop-
ment would be almost impossible through the use of part-time em-
ployees. What is needed is a group of people who are committed to
increasing their skills'and who would strive to achieve a high degree
of expertise in the various areas to which they were assigned to hold
hearings. Finally, we think that hearing officers should be subject
to a code of ethics designed to ensure the appearance and reality of
impartiality, with restrictions on political activities applicable to all
civil service employees.'2
H. Powers of Hearing Officers
1. Generally
Hearing officers need the power necessary to preside effectively at
administrative hearings. Thus, in general, hearing officers should
possess whatever authority the head of the agency would have were
he presiding-the power to hold necessary conferences, rule on the
evidence, govern the course of proof, and issue subpoenas. Once a
case -is assigned to a hearing officer, he should have the power to
schedule the hearing subject to the supervision of the director of the
central office. These suggestions are based on the proposition that
hearings will proceed smoothly and efficiently where the presiding
officer has authority to regulate their course.
Naturally, the presentation of the case will rest with the parties.
But where one of the parties is not represented by counsel, the
obligation of the hearing officer to make a full record for the agency
may require that the hearing officer elicit evidence. When a hearing
officer does this for a private party, there is probably little harm
129. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.904 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
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done to the administrative hearing process aside from some possible
annoyance on the part of the administrators. We do not mean to
suggest that it is not important to make government employees feel
that the hearings are fair. That is important, and certainly effective
administration may be impeded if these employees feel that their
best efforts are being frustrated by hearing officers who do not give
them a fair opportunity to present their cases. Nevertheless, that
problem is less significant than the problem that arises when the
state is unrepresented and the hearing officer elicits evidence to aid
the state's case. In that situation, the appearance of fairness is
overshadowed by the suggestion that the hearing officer is operating
on behalf of the state. Thus, the cause of fair hearings is probably
best served when the state is represented by legal counsel or by
administrators.
2. Recommended Decisions
One extremely important function of hearing officers is to prepare
recommended decisions. Without that power, a hearing officer be-
comes a listener without focus, who cannot be expected to guide the
proceedings in a way that will narrow the issues. Where the hearing
officer must function as a decision-maker, he can be expected to
assume a sharp sense of what evidence is relevant, to analyze the
case, to narrow the issues in terms of the questions that arise with
reference to applicable agency policy, and to guide the parties with
regard to the impact of agency policy on their case. In sum, the
requirement that a hearing officer make an initial decision forces
him to come to grips with the case. Moreover, the officer's decision
will serve as material for the director to use in training other hearing
officers.
The requirement that hearing officers make initial or recom-
mended decisions also facilitates the work of the agency. The agency
head, instead of being confronted by a raw record, may read a rea-
soned application by the hearing officer of the agency's administra-
tive law and policy to the facts and decide whether the analysis is
correct. Recommended decisions also help the private parties.
Where there is no recommended decision, the agency head is likely
to be given a staff recommendation based on the record. While such
staff recommendations may be given even where there is an initial
decision, a benefit of the initial decision is that, generally, the par-
ties are privy to such a report. Thus, the initial decision may help
the parties prepare their arguments and clarify their positions for
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the agency head as well as provide direction to the agency from a
neutral officer familiar with the record.
The right to be able to present a reasoned argument to the agency
head is extremely important. As the United States Supreme Court
once said:
The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims
of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit
argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be
but a barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the
Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control
of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the
Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before
it issues its final command.'3 °
When the case is not initially heard by the agency head, it is there-
fore important that there be available an initial decision to provide
the necessary focus for intelligent arguments to be presented to the
agency head.
While it might be possible to have recommended decisions made,
but not given to the parties, that seems extremely unfair. In an
opinion on behalf of the New Jersey Supreme Court in support of
the holding that parties to administrative adjudication were enti-
tled to see the hearing officer's report, Chief Justice Arthur T. Van-
derbilt said:
Where, as here, the final decision is rendered by one who did
not hear the evidence but relies, in part at least, upon the
findings and report of the hearing officer, there is an obvious
danger that the decision may be based on findings set forth in
the hearer's report that are not supported by the evidence. To
guard against this danger and to accord the appellant the fair
play to which he is entitled it is essential that prior to its
submission to the deciding officer the hearer's report be made
available to the parties and that they then be given an oppor-
tunity to correct any mistakes that may appear in the report.
This simple requirement, while imposing no hardship on the
130. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938),
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agency, does protect the individual against the strong possibil-
ity of a miscarriage of justice or the suspicion thereof.' 31
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act requires that a recom-
mended decision be made when the agency did not hear the case,' 31
and that it be part of the record.'33 Similarly, the Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,3 4 the Florida Administrative Procedure
Act, 35 and the New Jersey Administrative Procedure Act 13 provide
that recommended decisions must be served on the parties.
131. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 523-24, 105 A.2d 545, 559 (1954).
132. Administrative Procedure Act, § 8(a), 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1970). An exception is made
for rule-making and for the determination of initial license applications but the exception
applies only where the agency makes a tentative decision first, where a recommended decision
is made by an agency employee, or where agency business "imperatively and unavoidably"
requires.
133. Administrative Procedure Act, § 8(b), id. § 557(c) (1970).
134. Section 11 of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides:
When in a contested case a majority of the officials of the agency who are to render
the final decision have not heard the case or read the record, the decision, if adverse
to a party to the proceeding other than the agency itself, shall not be made until a
proposal for decision is served upon the parties, and an opportunity is afforded to each
party adversely affected to file exceptions and present briefs and oral argument to the
officials who are to render the decision. The proposal for decision shall contain a
statement of the reasons therefor and of each issue of fact or law necessary to the
proposed decision, prepared by the person who conducted the hearing or one who has
read the record. The parties by written stipulation may waive compliance with this
section.
Uniform Law Commissioners' Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 1970 ver-
sion, reprinted in K.C. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 579 app. (3d ed. 1972). One problem
with the Model Act is that it does not require that there be a recommended decision if the
agency head has read the record. We think that this is a mistake because it deprives a party
of the benefits of having a recommended decision.
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.58(1)(e) (West Supp. 1977). The text of the Florida provision
does not differ in any substantial and material way from the text of the Model Act provision.
See note 134 supra.
136. According to the New Jersey statute:
When a person not empowered to render an administrative adjudication is designated
by the head of the agency as the presiding officer, his recommended report and decision
containing recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be filed with the
agency and delivered or mailed to the parties of record; and an opportunity shall be
afforded each party of record to file exceptions, objections, and replies thereto, and to
present argument to the head of the agency or a majority thereof, either orally or in
writing, as the agency may order. The head of the agency shall adopt, reject or modify
the recommended report and decision. The recommended report and decision shall be
a part of the record in the case.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West Supp. 1977-1978).
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3. Effect of Recommended Decisions
Where recommended decisions represent the fair application of
administrative law and agency policy to the facts, a good chance
exists that agencies will adopt the decisions of the hearing officers.
In the last analysis, policy remains the prerogative of the agency
head, and the effect of recommended decisions should be left to the
discretion of each agency. Thus, an agency should have the power
to determine what force and effect the recommended decisions
should have. There are several possibilities. An agency could pro-
vide that it will review all recommended decisions automati-
cally-in effect saying that a recommended decision remains merely
a recommendation until approved. At the other extreme, an agency
could provide that decisions of the hearing officers are final deci-
sions of the agency. A more likely possibility is that an agency would
provide that a recommended decision becomes final after a certain
period if not appealed by a party (including the state) or certified
for review by the agency head. These alternatives are not the only
possibilities; agencies should be able to adopt rules that give the
recommended decisions an effect that is consistent with the needs
of each agency.
F. Funding the Central Office
There are at least three mechanisms for financing a central office
of hearing officers. The central office could have its own budget
financed by an appropriation from the general state fund; the ex-
penses of the central office could be borne entirely by the agencies
using its services; agencies could reimburse the central office for the
hearing officers they use while the general overhead"' of the office
is funded by a legislative appropriation. Unfortunately, there is a
dearth of information available evaluating the benefits of these
funding alternatives. In addition, there is insufficient information
to assess whether a central office would be more costly than the
present system.
Certainly, a great deal of money is currently being expended for
hearings in Pennsylvania.'38 Since a central office system would not
137. For the purposes of this article, overhead is considered to be all costs of the operation
of the central office, excluding the salary and fringe benefits of hearing officers.
138. The Pennsylvania Department of Justice, based on an informal study conducted by
one of the authors, has estimated that approximately $10 million is expended annually for
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significantly expand the number of hearings, there need not be a
great increase in costs. If the central office is to be funded by an
appropriation out of the general fund, then all appropriations to the
various agencies for hearing officers can be eliminated. Expenses for
all equipment, files, records, and other similar supplies which are
currently used by the agencies for the hearing function could simply
be transferred to the central office budget. In fact, it could be argued
that a central office would actually cost the Commonwealth less
than the present system due to the streamlining efficiency that
would be inherent in the centralized system. Since many of the costs
incurred by an agency using its own hearing officers are hidden in
the performance of other functions, it would be very difficult to
separate and identify the cost of hearings.'39 By eliminating the
identifiable costs of the hearing function in each agency, however,
the savings should nearly equal the total cost of the central office;
the only significant new costs would be for maintaining the staff
necessary to operate the central office.
Of course, there will be a variety of cost changes in a central office
system that are hard to predict and more difficult to quantify. For
example, the time spent by agency personnel supervising hearing
officers and finding and hiring new hearing officers will be saved
under a central office system. At the same time, in agencies in which
the decisional process has heretofore been relatively informal, there
will now be added costs of such procedures as having to take excep-
tions to the recommended decision and to file briefs in support of
the position that the staff would like the agency to take. This addi-
tional expense is not confined solely to a central office system but
would apply to any system that involves the use of recommended
decisions.
Although it is impossible to predict with any certainty that a
central office will result in greater or lesser costs to the government,
the hearing process in Pennsylvania.
139. For example, an assistant attorney general assigned to a state agency might be
required to sit as a hearing officer one day per week. Since the attorney would most probably
be listed as a staff attorney in the agency's budget, it would be nearly impossible for the
legislature to identify 20% of that individual's salary as related to the hearing function. Thus,
the agency would not lose this small amount of money from its general appropriation. How-
ever, a central office hearing examiner would perform that function no longer performed by
the agency, and its funding would reflect the costs incurred. Although this results in a higher
net cost to the Commonwealth, the agency benefits since it now has an attorney who can
direct full attention to the agency's substantive responsibilities.
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even if the central office were to result in increased costs, we feel
that the inevitable increases in the quality and fairness of the hear-
ings held will justify costs.
There are several benefits from having the agencies pay for the
entire cost of the operation of the central office. Yet a glaring nega-
tive feature prevents us from endorsing it. If agencies bear the cost
of the hearings, an agency may be charged for the amount of time
it uses a hearing officer provided by the central office. The agency
may also pay its pro-rata share of the overhead of the central off-
ice.'10 This system of financing the central office would obviate the
necessity of determining the amount of funding necessary for a gen-
eral appropriation since the central office could bill the agencies and
thereby receive funds from their appropriations. The major draw-
back, however, is that an agency, in an effort to save money, may
forego a hearing entirely to avoid utilizing a hearing officer provided
by the central office, particularly when an agency doubts that a
hearing is necessary. As a result, there may be a failure to grant
hearings when they would be desirable. This would be unaccepta-
ble. If agencies were required to reimburse the office only for the
hearing officers it uses while the overhead of the office is funded by
a general appropriation, the incentive of agencies to forego the hear-
ing process altogether would be lessened, but perhaps not elimi-
nated. A means of entirely eliminating this undesirable situation is
to grant a general appropriation to the central office out of which it
must perform all its functions."'
Although the selection of the funding mechanism for the central
office is important, it is not essential that the "right" choice be
made initially. In fact, the central office, once established, may be
best equipped to study the funding problem and make recommen-
dations to the General Assembly. A general appropriation is easy to
administer and the most common means of funding a new office.
Therefore, an appropriation-rather than a complicated billing
structure-should be the initial source of funds. Another factor sup-
140. If, for example, an agency utilizes five percent of the total number of hearing officers
employed by the central office, in addition to paying the central office for the use of the
hearing officers' time, the agency must pay five percent of the overhead of the central office.
141. In his assessment of the California experience and its central pool of hearing officers,
Coan agrees. He stated: "there is no question in my mind that an independent Office of
Administrative Hearing should be budgeted from the general fund, just as our courts are
budgeted." Coan, supra note 107, at 91.
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porting this view is that passage of proposed legislation would be
rendered more difficult if an unusual means of funding were pro-
posed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania presently lacks any system for the provision of hear-
ing officers to state agencies that require them. Each agency now
uses its own devices to attract suitable personnel to conduct hear-
ings. A central office with the function of supplying hearing officers
would free the agencies from the task of recruiting and supervising
hearing officers, and at the same time would cultivate an impartial
hearing process. This independence would aid in ensuring both the
appearance and actuality of fairness in administrative hearings.
Furthermore, the existence of an office with the primary function
of improving the performance of hearing officers will tend to im-
prove the quality of hearings and decisions rendered. A central office
system would create the opportunity for people to become career
adjudicators who can utilize their talents, polish their skills, and
become highly qualified in conducting admininstrative hearings.
We should emphasize that a central office will depend upon the
people who operate it. The capabilities of the first director will be a
crucial factor in its success. Therefore, in addition to recommending
the establishment of a central office, we suggest that its first direc-
tor be a person of unblemished integrity with a sophisticated under-
standing of the administrative process and the ability to be stead-
fast in his or her devotion to the goals of the office.
Although there are other methods by which the present hearing
procedures might be improved, it is our opinion that the establish-
ment of a central office for the provision of hearing officers will
substantially improve the administrative process.
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